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Aristotle's *Phantasia* in the *Rhetoric*: 
*Lexis, Appearance, and the Epideictic Function of Discourse*

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**Introduction**

The well-known opening line of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, where he defines rhetoric as a “counterpart” (*antistrophos*) to dialectic, has spurred many conversations on Aristotelian rhetoric and motivated the widespread interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of civic discourse as heavily rationalistic. This study starts from a statement in the *Rhetoric* less discussed, yet still important, that suggests that a visual aspect inheres in Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric. Near the beginning of book 3, which deals with *lexis* (style, sometimes subsuming delivery\(^1\)), Aristotle conjoins *lexis* and *phantasia* with the copula “is” (*eimi*): “The subject of expression [*lexêôs*], however, has some necessary place in all teaching; for to speak in one way rather than another does make some difference in regard to clarity, though not a great difference; but all these things are forms of outward show [*phantasia*] and intended to affect the audience” (1404a).\(^2\) Whereas scholars exploring the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic have compared and contrasted the *Rhetoric* and the *Topics*, I explore rhetoric’s relationship with phantasia by reading the *Rhetoric* alongside *De Anima*. *De Anima* is Aristotle’s seminal account of the senses and their relationship to *psychê* (often translated “soul”). It addresses topics intimately connected to rhetoric: perception, cognition, deliberation, visualization, imagination, and the image. Phantasia is integral to each of these psychic processes and to Aristotle’s understanding of the function of appearance in human experience. Hence, it is a lens suitable for exploring the relationship between Aristotle’s conception of civic discourse and his notions of sight and appearances as they relate to perception, interpretation, deliberation, and judgment. I find in Aristotle’s phantasia a tie between his art of rhetoric and his psychology and phenomenology (anachronistic though these terms are). Aristotle’s psychological works, as Richard McKeon points out, are foundational to Aristotle’s philosophy, and thus to his *Rhetoric*.

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“Psychological inquiries occupy an extremely important position in the philosophy of Aristotle, for the conception of the psyché lays the foundation for the continuity of functions in nature” (1947, 142). De Anima, especially, articulates the psychological and phenomenological conceptions often tacitly at work in the Rhetoric.

The importance of phantasias for the trajectory of ancient rhetorical and aesthetic theory is seen in the parallels between the visual arts, rhetoric, and poetics in Greek and Roman thought. As David Freedberg states (perhaps, slightly overstates), parallels between painting and poetry are “to be found everywhere in classical literature” (1989, 50). With respect to such visual-verbal parallels in Aristotle, D. Thomas Benediktson’s reading of Aristotle’s psychological, poetic, and rhetorical works concludes that phantasias tie together the visual and the literary. “[Aristotle’s passages on phantasias] do help to see why Aristotle took for granted the similarity, almost the identity, of literature and the visual arts. Both types of art are imagistic; they present to the viewer either an image, as in visual art, or as in literature, a set of moving images that the soul then uses as raw data (phantasia) to enable thought to occur” (2000, 170). Phantasias developed a legacy in Hellenistic aesthetics, where it came to designate supraleralism in painting, moving art “beyond imitation” (Fowler 1989, 180–81). In later Greco-Roman works, phantasias were used to designate vivid imagery in written and oral discourse, imagery that could create sights and scenes in the minds of audience members. As Quintilian noted in his discussion of forensic rhetoric, in Latin phantasias were termed visiones. Here, phantasias became a mode of displacing narrative in rhetorical discourse:

There are certain experiences which the Greeks call phantasias, and the Romans visiones [visiones], whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes. . . . From such impressions arises that enargeia which Cicero calls illumination [illumination] and actuality [evidential], which makes us seem not so much to narrate [dicere] as to exhibit [ostendere] the actual scene. (Institutio Oratoria 4.2.29, 32)

Quintilian’s invocations of phantasias and enargeia can be traced to Aristotle’s discussion of rhetorical style in book 3 of the Rhetoric, where Aristotle addresses phantasia and energeia.

The word phantasia in Aristotle is often translated “imagination” (and phantasma, “image”), and sometimes “impressions,” “outward show,” or “appearance.” In fact, as I will explain below, it seems to travel each of
these semantic trajectories. It is a critical concept in *De Anima*, directly implicated in Aristotle’s theories of perception, knowledge, and memory. Although the word *phantasia* appears only nine times in the *Rhetoric*, its cognates are used throughout and its importance to Aristotle’s conception of rhetorical affect and style is evident upon a close reading of the text. An understanding of phantasia illuminates the relationship between rhetoric and psychê, especially as mediated through Aristotle’s chief sense, sight (*De Anima* 429a; *Metaphysics* 980a), and modified by art and reasoning. Aristotle writes, “Thus the other animals live by impressions [*phantasiais*] and memories, and have but a small share of experience [*empeirias*]; but the human race lives also by art [*technê*] and reasoning [*logismoi*]” (*Metaphysics* 980a). Human phantasia, as I will show, is distinct from the phantasia of other animals because it moves between and among sensation and art, experience and reason.

In this essay, I present three ways that phantasia illuminates Aristotle’s conception of the art of rhetoric and his theory of civic discourse. First, I argue for the relationship between lexis and phantasia, stressing the visual quality of Aristotle’s conception of rhetorical style. Second, I argue that the relationship between lexis and phantasia reveals a basic visual component in Aristotle’s conception of discourse, one that is seen most clearly in those discourses Aristotle calls epideictic. This, then, suggests that a “rhetorical order” is implied in Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric, one that qualifies interpretations of that theory that stress its linearity and rationalism. The epideictic function of discourse, marked by imaging and a spatial logic, emerges from my reading as having a primal or foundational role in Aristotle’s conception of public discourse. Before I proceed with these arguments, however, I offer an interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of phantasia as it is theorized in *De Anima*.

**Phantasia in *De Anima***

The complexity of Aristotle’s discussion of phantasia has brought to the fore a number of interpretive questions that have occupied scholars in classics and antiquity. Key questions include the status of phantasia as a “faculty” of the psychê, the relation of phantasia to the other faculties of the psychê, the place of phantasia in Aristotle’s argument in *De Anima*, the nature of the activity of phantasia, and the sense of Aristotle’s analogies...
between phantasia and light, sight, and especially the “image.” My dis-
cussion of phantasia will address each of these questions. However, it is the
last question which is most relevant to my study, and which I therefore
address first.

The relationship of phantasia to “image” needs to be addressed with
care, for it is easy to follow an Enlightenment empiricist line and to think
of phantasia exclusively as entailing pictorial images. Aristotle writes near
the beginning of his central discussion of phantasia in De Anima 3.3, “but
in phantastan we are like spectators looking at something dreadful or en-
couraging in a picture” (427b). This analogy has led some to conceive of
phantasia as grounded in the mental experience of pictorial representation.
For example, Richard Sorabji understands phantasia as “the power of hav-
ing images,” such that “thinking” is the process wherein a mental picture is
formed in the mind (1972, 72–73). Images do play an important role in
Aristotle’s discussion of phantasia; however, as Martha Nussbaum (1978)
argues, many passages that address phantasia can be understood without
invoking “images,” and some passages do not make sense under an image
theory alone. Aristotle’s phantasia is thus not simply a forerunner to em-
piricist image theories of meaning. In place of the “image,” Nussbaum puts
“what appears”—phantasia is the faculty of appearances in a broad sense
and not strictly of images-as-pictorial-representations (242). Still,
Nussbaum’s account gives the visual an integral role in Aristotle’s discus-
sion of phantasia. “Phantasia is the faculty in virtue of which the animal
sees his object as an object of a certain sort” (255). It entails, then, inten-
tionality or interpretation that is understood by Aristotle primarily in terms
derived from the experience of sight.6 Seeing, spectating, light, images,
pictures, and imagining figure prominently in Aristotle’s discussions of
phantasia. Although an exhaustive theory of phantasia would benefit from
testing the limits of the “sight” analogy, the visual has paradigmatic func-
tion in Aristotle’s account.7

The faculty of phantasia is complex. It is integral to “the synthesis
and retention of sense-perceptions” and to “applying thought to objects of
sense-perception” (Frede 1992, 282; emphasis original). As such, phantasia,
as Malcolm Schofield notes, approaches the status of “a comprehensive
faculty by which we apprehend sensory and quasi-sensory presentations
generally” (1992, 250). Schofield is reluctant to assign this preeminent
status to phantasia because Aristotle clearly expresses skepticism about its
reliability as a mental operation that issues in reliable knowledge. How-
ever, even as he retains skepticism, his De Anima clearly implicates
phantasia in the full range of cognitive and perceptive activities of humans. It operates, as W. S. Hett summarizes, both in the presence of sensible objects, interpreting them to the mind, and in their absence, bringing absent objects to the mind in what we would call variously memory, contemplation, and imagination (1935, xiii). Thus, as Dorothea Frede argues, De Anima grants phantasia an integral role in both sense perception and thought (1992); however, as Schofield argues, Aristotle takes a “skeptical, cautious, or non-committal” approach to the reliability of phantasia (1992, 252). It is presented in De Anima as fundamental and necessary to human mental operations, yet is evidently fallible. This conception of phantasia mirrors Aristotle’s view of rhetoric as necessary and unavoidable, but nonetheless vulnerable to misuse and able to mislead.

Although phantasia is commonly translated as both “mental image” and “imagination,” Schofield notes that “we should be wary about assimilating phantasia and imagination,” since phantasia in De Anima has a richer and more fluid denotation than contemporary conceptions of imagination (1992, 251). Frede describes phantasia’s designations as such:

*Phantasia* does triple duty. It designates the capacity, the activity or process, and the product or result. ... We have no single word in English that would do all three jobs. ... “Appearance” in a wider sense should be regarded as the central meaning (of *phantasia*) to which all functions of the term are related. It would then be (i) the capacity to experience an appearance, (ii) the ongoing appearance itself, and (iii) what appears. (1992, 279; emphasis added)

*De Anima* itself approaches an analytic definition of phantasia as capacity, process, and product. Aristotle writes, “If imagination [*phantasia*] is ... the process by which we say that an image [*phantasma*] is presented to us, it is one of those faculties [*dunamis*] or states of the mind [*hexis*] by which we judge and are either right or wrong” (428a). In describing phantasia as a power by which we judge, Aristotle gives it an epistemological function. Elsewhere in *De Anima*, phantasia is described as the basis for thinking, rather than a form of thinking, in that phantasia provides for the mind (*nous*) mental images by which the mind is able to calculate or deliberate. This mental calculation consists of “combination” (*sumplokê*) and is essential to the formation of opinion (*doxa*) through practical reasoning and the realization of truth (*alêthês*) through contemplative thought (428b, 431a, 431b).

The images phantasia provides to the mind for deliberation have their origin in sense perception. Aristotle describes phantasia as a movement
produced by sense perception (429a), putting the former in a causal relationship to the latter. Consistent with this causal relationship, phantasia is the faculty by which sense perceptions are retained; Frede calls the mental images retained by phantasia “after-images” (1992, 280). However, phantasia’s retention of sense perceptions does not make it equivalent to memory. For Aristotle, as Frede shows, memory “is always the act of remembering a past experience qua past” (1992, 285). Phantasia’s activity is not limited to remembering per se, but includes imagining, visualizing, even dreaming.

Even though phantasia is implicated in activities of the psyche ranging from perception to contemplation, it is clear in De Anima that phantasia is a distinct faculty of the psyche, independent from thought (noêsis) and sense perception (aisthêsis), the two most prominent parts of the Aristotelian conception of the psyche (427b). Phantasia is portrayed as intermingling with thought and as a necessary condition for thought to function, but nevertheless as a power having peculiar character and identity. Likewise, phantasia is, according to Aristotle, “similar to sensation” and “cannot exist without sensation” (428b), but is distinct from it. Importantly, as I have stressed, phantasia is most similar to the sensation of sight: “imagination (phantasia) must be a movement produced by sensation actively operating. Since sight (opsis) is the chief sense, the name phantasia is derived from phaos (light), because without light it is impossible to see” (429a). Phantasia is thus portrayed in De Anima as dependent on sight and as a sort of visual capacity of the psyche, or psyche-sight, that can function apart from immediate sensory sight, as in what we normally call imagination.

Although the faculty of phantasia is not unique to the human psyche, it serves a specific function there. All animal life depends on phantasia, as all animal movement depends on it. Brute beasts are moved by their appetites, yet their appetites depend on phantasia to lead them, as, for example, a dog imagines a treat as it responds obediently to the summons of its owner (433b). Humans, too, of course, may act on such visual impulses, thinking and acting like beasts. Yet phantasia’s unique and critical place in human art and reasoning is in deliberation. De Anima states that all human deliberation depends on phantasia, whether it be of the philosophical sort or the practical sort, whether it concerns fact or value.

But sometimes by means of images [phantasmaginis] or thoughts in the psyche, just as if it were seeing, it calculates and plans for the future in view of the present; and when it makes a statement, as in sensation it asserts that an object is pleasant or unpleasant, in this case it avoids or pursues; and so generally in action. What does not involve action, i.e., the true or false, belongs to
the same sphere as what is good or evil; but they differ in having respectively a universal and a particular reference. (431b)

In *De Anima*, Aristotle describes this sort of phantasmatic mental activity as *bouleutikê*, designating deliberation as entailing the combination of mental images (434a). Elsewhere in Aristotle's corpus, *bouleutikê* refers to deliberation in the political council (see *Nicomachean Ethics* 1141b, *Politics* 1329a, *Rhetoric* 1383a). The similarity between *bouleutikê* as a mental activity and as an activity of discourse is suggestive, as both may be understood as processes of taking appearances into account. Rhetoric's distinctiveness lay in its overt artistic quality (see *Rhetoric* 1354a, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1139b–1140a).

Phantasia shows how the artistic quality of rhetoric is not the sole reason for the ambivalence Aristotle expresses about the epistemic status of rhetoric. Appearances, from his perspective, are inherently unstable and often unreliable. Although phantasia is essential to human perception, cognition, memory, and imagination, it is not entirely reliable or accurate. For example, Aristotle notes how we depend on phantasia "when we do not perceive distinctly" (428a). In the case of an object far from the spectator that is not clear to her perception, phantasia "fills in" what cannot be perceived. Not surprisingly, the image produced by phantasia may misconstrue the object. Similarly, the after-images of phantasia, this residue of sense perception, may be distorted by time, temperament, emotions, sleepiness, and other factors (429a). So, for example, my memory of spectating a great athletic performance will not be altogether reliable as a source for historical facts about the performance, especially if I am emotionally engaged with my sports team. Hence, though phantasia depends on sense perceptions, "there is no need to assume any precise correspondence between a phantasma and that which it is a phantasma of" (Frede 1992, 285; emphasis original).

In sum: in *De Anima*, phantasia is intimately connected to the sense of sight, preserving visual perceptions in a sort of after-image, and is itself a sort of psychê-sight, the source of mental images or visual impressions. Phantasia is a distinct part of the psychê, essential to all animal action and all human thought, including deliberation, contemplation, and creativity. It underlies and mediates between sense perception and the mind. This definition of phantasia suggests its significance for Aristotle's *technê* of rhetoric. Judgment (*krisis*), whether private and mental or public and deliberative, entails deliberation about appearances, and more basically, psychic and
ARISTOTLE’S PHANTASIA

epistemic processes that depend on phantasia. Turning now to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, I will consider the significance of phantasia for his conception of public discourse, beginning with his pairing of lexis and phantasia in book 3.

Lexis as Phantasia

At the beginning of his discussion of lexis in book 3, Aristotle associates it with phantasia, saying of lexis, “but all these things are forms of outward show [phantasia] and intended to affect the audience” (1404a). In George Kennedy’s translation, quoted here, because of the apparent ambivalence of Aristotle toward the subject of lexis, phantasia gets the rendition “outward show” and, in John Henry Freese’s translation, the even more ignoble “mere outward show.” These translators have followed the denotation of phantasesthai seen in Herodotus (7.10), but not used frequently until the time of Polybius. However, to be consistent with the predominant denotation of phantasia and its cognates in Aristotle, we should translate the phrase “all’ hapanta phantasia taut’ esti kai pros ton akrotên” as “but all this is appearance and is for the audience.” In any case, it is clear that Aristotle here puts lexis, phantasia, and the rhetorical audience in relationship to each other, and this in a context where lexis itself is being addressed with a good degree of ambivalence (see Fortenbaugh 1986). In this section, I draw upon Aristotle’s notion of phantasia in De Anima that I have outlined above to argue that Aristotle conceived of lexis primarily in visual terms and that this visual quality of lexis helps explain the ambivalence toward lexis expressed at the beginning of book 3.

The beginning of book 3 of the Rhetoric suggests that lexis, which encompasses style and sometimes delivery, may be a means by which an orator makes messages clear: “for to speak in one way rather than another does make some difference in regard to clarity [dêlôsai]” (1404a). Dêloô, “to make visible or manifest” (LSJ 1968, “dêloô”), overlaps with the semantic domain of saphês, “clarity,” which Aristotle makes the virtue or excellence (arête) of lexis (1404b). Dêloô, saphês, and phantasia are each associated with lexis and each has visual connotations, as they all have to do with manifestation or appearance. Lexis, these associations indicate, has to do with “what appears” through language. Aristotle’s characterization of lexis as phantasia in the Rhetoric provides ground for using phantasia’s psychological denotations to better understand his conception
of lexis. There are two aspects of Aristotle’s discussion of lexis in the Rhetoric that corroborate the important ties between lexis and De Anima’s phantasia. They are the similarities in their form and in their relationship to the affections.

Aristotle’s discussion of the rhetorical phenomenon of “bringing before the eyes” (tô pro ommatôn poien) in the Rhetoric corresponds with De Memoria’s and the Poetics’s descriptions of “putting [tithêmi] before the eyes.” In De Memoria, “putting before the eyes” is used to describe phantasia in private mental deliberation: “the man who is thinking . . . puts a finite magnitude before his eyes [tithêmai pro ommatôn]” (450a). In the Poetics, Aristotle advises, “In constructing plots and completing the effect by the help of dialogue the poet should, as far as possible, keep the scene before his eyes [pro ommatôn tithemenon]” (1455a). These passages resemble the rhetorical practice of “bringing before the eyes,” which works by “prompting audiences to visualize (metaphoric) images before them” (Newman 2002, 8–9). “Bringing before the eyes,” Sarah Newman argues, is a basic “visualizing effect [that] lies in sense perception” (12; see Rhetoric 1411b). An identity between private mental deliberation and rhetorical spectatorship lies in the fundamental phantasmatic form of each activity—both put before the mind’s eye phantasmata. Aristotle writes, “mental images [phantasmata] are similar to objects perceived except that they are without matter” (De Anima 432a). The phantasmatic capacity of the psyche may be activated from within, through imagination or “putting” before the mind images, or from without, through the speaker “bringing before the eyes” objects, events, persons, and scenes. The mental operations are alike. In my discussion of phantasia in De Anima, I noted that Aristotle describes phantasia as a movement produced by sense perception (429a). Likewise, he argues that “bringing before the eyes” is a lexical form of energeia, a type of motion (kinêsis) realized through the capacity of the mind for seeing objects in action (Newman 2002, 20; see Rhetoric 1411b and Metaphysics 1048b). In Aristotle’s conception, through lexis, words can be made to move so as to activate the phantasmatic capacities of audience members. What is absent before the eyes physically is made present to the mind through lexis, in the same way that an individual may “put” images before her mind while imagining. Thus, the processes of private cognition analyzed in De Anima, and the process of lexical spectating in “bring before the eyes” discussed in the Rhetoric, both entail a dynamic and visual form.

Another correspondence between the Rhetoric’s lexis and De Anima’s phantasia is their effect on the emotions. In the Rhetoric, lexis is associ-
ated with emotional appeals (1404a). In fact, much of Aristotle’s ambivalence toward lexis in the beginning of book 3 is due to its power to stir strong emotions in an audience, which may preclude good judgment. In *De Anima*, Aristotle puts phantasia in a complex relationship with emotion (*pathos*), one that has important implications for rhetoric. Phantasia, when it is used in *De Anima* to refer to the capacity of the psyche to willfully bring images to mind, is called a *pathos*, “an affection that lies in our power whenever we choose” (427b). Aristotle here seems to suggest that phantasia can be a means by which to stir oneself consciously into an affective state through manipulating one’s imagination. Aristotle distinguishes this mode of phantasia from opinion (*doxa*), arguing, “it is not in our power to form opinions as we will” (427b). Instead, “when we form an opinion that something is threatening or frightening, we are immediately affected by it” (427b). Opinion’s resistance to the conscious control of the will affords it an urgent and unpredictable affective power. This power is derived from opinion’s external grounding—we form opinions about the world about us, and the world about us forms our opinions. Opinion thus has a different field of reference than the imagination. However, it does not have a different form. It, too, is dependent on the imaging capacity of the psyche. Through phantasia, opinion makes judgments about the world of appearances that are, according to Aristotle, true or false (428b; see also *Metaphysics* 1010b).

Rhetoric is for Aristotle an art that may shape opinion and direct the affections through the creation of images. For example, he writes, “Let fear [*phobos*] be [defined as] a sort of pain or agitation derived from the imagination [*phantasias*] of a future destructive or painful or evil” (*Rhetoric* 1382a). Similarly, “shame is imagination [*phantasia*] about a loss of reputation” (1384a) and “honor and reputation are among the pleasantest things, through each person’s imagining [*phantasian*] that he has the qualities of an important person” (1371a). Here, emotional appeals depend on the ability of the speaker to activate the capacity of the auditor for phantasia and to lead him or her to an opinion. In the *Rhetoric*, a primary instrument for such appeals is lexis, as speakers use lexical techniques to produce images that evoke emotional states in audiences.

*De Anima*’s phantasia and the *Rhetoric*’s lexis, then, mirror each other’s form (that is, their dynamic and visual aspect) and power (that is, in their capacity to affect opinion and emotion through the production of images). Returning, then, to Aristotle’s statement about lexis in the opening of book 3 of the *Rhetoric*—“all these things are *phantasia*”—phantasia
inflected through *De Anima* offers a means for further understanding Aristotle’s conception of style and delivery. Lexis can be a visual phenomenon, dynamic in form, which has the particular power to stir the emotions and shape opinion. Speakers may activate lexis to produce visual images in the psyché of an auditor and thus influence her judgment.

Aristotle’s discussion of phantasia in *De Anima* can be employed to support two important conclusions about Aristotelian lexis. First, *De Anima* shows that lexis is a critical component of the end of rhetoric. *krisis* or judgment (*Rhetoric* 1358b). It makes phantasia an integral component of mental deliberation, where the deliberating subject calculates by manipulating mental images in her head (431a, 434b). The phantasmatic character of lexis may make rhetorical judgment, too, reliant on images, as images activated through lexis are brought before the mind’s eyes of auditors and form the basis for the mental deliberations that underlie rhetorical *krisis*. Second, *De Anima*’s discussion of phantasia illuminates Aristotle’s apparent ambivalence (in *Rhetoric* book 3) toward lexis in rhetorical practice. In *De Anima*, phantasia, though an integral component of human perception and cognition, is nevertheless portrayed as quite vulnerable to distortion and error, due to any number of factors internal or external to the knowing and perceiving subject—for example, too little sleep, emotional immaturity, or insufficient visual stimuli. Similarly, the psychological condition of an audience, as the *Rhetoric* makes startlingly clear, may undo the rhetorical process and inhibit the achievement of its prescribed end, *krisis*: “for it is wrong to warp the jury by leading them into anger or envy or pity” (1354a). That lexis is artistic (*entechnon*) makes it all the more susceptible to creating the wrong impression, so to speak, as speakers may create images before the mental eye of the auditor that serve their own whims rather than prudent political ends (*Rhetoric* 1404a). Thus, lexis is integral to rhetorical judgment, even as it renders rhetorical judgment problematic.

In the *Rhetoric*, epideictic—the rhetoric of “showing forth”—is the most lexical of the rhetorical species. It may also be Aristotle’s least favored rhetorical practice. My analysis of lexis has implications for our understanding of Aristotle’s notion of “epideictic,” a category he seems to have invented. Edward Schiappa (1999) has argued that Aristotle’s account of epideictic is neither historically accurate nor generically adequate. My argument for the role of phantasia in Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric suggests that Aristotle’s account of epideictic may be read productively despite questions about its historical accuracy and generic adequacy. We might miti-
gate the historical and generic trouble that Aristotle’s account presents if we note the fluidity of his conception of epideictic and understand his account as describing a particular function of discourse, the phantasmatic function. More importantly, however, we might better understand his conception of the way public discourse works. In the following section, I extend the notion of Aristotelian lexis I have developed here to argue that Aristotelian epideictic is a “visual rhetoric” containing a “primal” function within Aristotle’s theory of public discourse.

Epideictic as visual and primal

That phantasia is shared with brute beasts, whereas mind (nous) is not, suggests an order in the human psyche, where phantasia is “lower” and mind “higher.” However, phantasia is integral and essential to the operations of the mind. Although phantasia may be “lower” or “primal,” it is nevertheless the basis for the full range of functions of the psyché, not the least deliberation (bouleutikê). In this section, I show how the notion of phantasia as “primal” suggests a corresponding rhetorical order, where epideictic rhetoric, the most overtly lexical of rhetoric practices, occupies a primal place in public discourse. I will proceed first by arguing for the basic visual nature of Aristotle’s conception of epideictic, and then offer reasons for its primal place in public discourse.12

Aristotle’s conception of epideictic depends on notions of space and scale and on conceptions of internal and external sight, topics which delimit his discussion of phantasia in De Anima. Aristotle stresses that epideictic depends more on lexis than do the other rhetorical practices, as it relies on amplification, a topos of degree and size, over enthymematic reasoning or examples, both of which depend on linear logics (Rhetoric 1368a, 403b; see also 1392a). Of amplification, Aristotle writes,

Amplification [auxesis], with good reason, falls among forms of praise; for it aims to show superiority, and superiority is one of the forms of the honorable. . . . In general, among those classes of things common to all speeches, amplification is the most at home in those that are epideictic; for these take up actions that are agreed upon, so that what remains is to clothe the actions with greatness [megethos] and beauty [kallos]. (Rhetoric 1368a)
The means by which amplification “dresses up” a subject is through comparison or contrast: analogy (1363b), arguments for relative superiority (1368a), and metaphor (1412a). Further, the lexical devices of expansiveness (1407b), the period (1409a–b), and “bringing before the eyes” (1411b–1412a) may be invoked to expand the subject and make it superior.

At the center of Aristotle’s conception of amplification is megethos, or magnitude. Megethos, Thomas B. Farrell writes, is at “the root of a great many recurring issues in Aristotelian inquiry” (1995, 186). It is a notion morphologically and conceptually tied to important Aristotelian themes like the more and the less, the big and small, and the virtues of magnificence (megaloprepeia) and greatness of psyche (megalopsychia). In De Anima, the perception of magnitude—for instance, the size of the sun—is intimately tied to phantasia, which provides “a kind of comparative seeing” embedded in a spatial logic, such that what appears immediately before the eyes (the sun, which looks no bigger than my thumb) can be sized up via phantasia by comparing and contrasting it mentally to other objects (my thumb, treetops, chimneys) (Frede 1992, 286; see De Anima 428b). In the Rhetoric, especially in book 1, megethos, as a quality relative to time, place, and circumstance, addresses the realm of appearances. The speaker who invokes megethos sketches out the relative magnitude of public appearances; “dressing up” is also a form of “sizing up.” Megaloprepeia, for example, may be manifested in the size of expenditures displayed materially or lexically, as the speaker “dresses up” the subject. Similarly, megalopsychia can be manifested according to a scale of honor that is rhetorically constructed (compare Nicomachean Ethics 1098b, 1122a–1125a; Rhetoric 1360b, 1362b). Aristotle’s discussion of the “good” in the Rhetoric repeatedly turns to notions of size, scale, and degree (1362a–1363a), and flows into his overall account of the topos of magnitude (1363b–1365b). Each of these categories—megaloprepeia, megalopsychia, and the “good”—make magnitude an interpretive frame. Epideictic, as the aspect of discourse especially given to the invocation of magnitude, provides for the polis through lexis as phantasia images of honor and shame, or virtue or vice, that can be “sized up” and interpreted according to a logic of scale. How great was his courage? How expansive was her generosity? As the Rhetoric shows frequently in books 1 and 2, height and depth, big and small, and more or less, underlie a range of rhetorical presentations and corresponding judgments that seek to determine the value of what is, or what may be.
Megethos is paired with kalos in Aristotle’s explanation of amplification quoted above. The end (telos) of Aristotelian epideictic is to convincingly display kalos or aischros; respectively, these can be rendered “noble/fine/beautiful” and “shameful/disgraceful/ugly.” Although these terms denote qualities of character or being and as such might seem inherently abstract and invisible, they have concrete visual connotations. For example, Aristotle couples kalos with virtuous action, “an ability for doing good [dynamis euergetikê]” (Rhetoric 1366b),14 evoking the Homeric notion of kalos, which referred to “the beauty of outward form” (LSJ, 1968, “kalos”). Similarly, Pythagoras, it is said, spoke of those who lived tôn kallistôn theôrian, “to contemplate beautiful things” (qtd. in Lobkowicz 1967, 5). Homeric and Pythagorean notions of kalos can be seen, whether in public presentation or private meditation.15 In this vein, the Nicomachean Ethics can proceed with a discussion of the goods of the psychê by characterizing those in whom these goods are seen. Inward states are manifested outwardly. Similarly, Aristotle’s account of epideictic discourse describes how virtue is given outward, visible form when a character is magnified through lexis.

Aristotle’s characterization of the epideictic auditor as theoros thus takes on a complex valence. One already indicated in Pythagoras’s reference to those who engage in contemplation (theôria) of the beautiful form. Aristotle states that deliberative and judicial discourses have judges (kritai), but epideictic has theoroi (Rhetoric 1358b). The verbal form of theoros is theôrô, “to view” or “to behold.” Theoros, as a noun, has a number of denotations, from mere “spectator,” as at an athletic event, to a philosopher or contemplator. In De Anima, Aristotle repeatedly ties theôrô to phantasias, where theôrô provides both a means of describing the experience of phantaia by analogy, and an analytical category to denote the cognitive activity of phantasias. With respect to the former, Aristotle writes, “But in imagination [phantasian] we are like spectators [theômenoi] looking at something dreadful or encouraging in a picture” (427b). Here the notion of spectating is employed to illustrate the quality of distance and perspective that inheres in mental imaging. As an analytical category in both De Anima and De Memoria, theôrô is frequently used to denote the mental activity of seeing an image, especially exclusively mental images. Another verb for “to see,” horô, is used in these texts to refer to sensory sight of objects immediately present before the eyes. Thus, Lawrence Rosenfield’s conclusion that the epideictic auditor is a type of witness or seer, who sees with the “mind’s eye,” has substantive grounding in Aristotle’s use of theôrô.
(1980). However, whereas Rosenfield would have the auditor be a witness to Being, my reading of Aristotle’s phantasia would have her be a witness to images lexically produced. Rosenfield’s contemplative account is hard to square with Aristotle’s characterization of epideictic as such: “But since it often happens, both seriously and in jest, that not only a man or a god is praised but inanimate objects and any random one of the other animals, propositions on these subjects must be grasped in the same way (as we grasp those on human nobility)” (Rhetoric 1366a). Although the Pythagorean and other pre-Socratic strains of theoros may suggest contemplation, any exclusively contemplative conception of epideictic not only misses its ties to phantasia, but also fails to probe Aristotle’s pronounced ambivalence with respect to epideictic practice. Epideictic provides images of various and disparate values for public observation and, perhaps, deliberation. Aristotle says of epideictic, “Praise is speech that makes clear the greatness of virtue” (Rhetoric 1367b). In epideictic speech, this “making clear” (emphanizôn), which like phantasia is derived from phaos (light), could be a product of lexis as phantasia. Through lexis, the theoros mentally sees the subject take shape.

Epideictic’s phantasmatic quality “demotes” the rhetorical species to the everyday world of appearances (rather than elevating it to the witnessing of Being) and to a life among the foundational, basic, and “base” spheres of psychê. As a phantasmatic phenomenon, epideictic operates at the “primal” levels of desire and/or emotion. Desire and emotion underlie the assent, commitment, and judgment based on deliberation, but they do not constitute such convictions. As De Anima asserts, the capacity for imaging is among the most primal of animal capacities, and the most universal. It underlies all other forms of higher-order mental activities. Epideictic’s phantasmatic quality suggests a conception of it that is similarly primal. Dale Sullivan, Gerard Hauser, and Jeffery Walker have each argued for the priority of epideictic in ancient rhetorical thought. Sullivan (1992) appeals to sophistic rhetorical conceptions of the rhetoric of belief, showing how belief may be a more basic rhetorical end than judgment. Hauser (1999) stresses the ways in which epideictic provided ancients and moderns with a common language of values and virtues on which deliberative discourse is constructed. Similarly, Walker (2000) argues that epideictic was for the ancients the rhetoric of belief and desire that formed the basis of all rhetorics of practical decision making. My argument arrives at a conclusion harmonious with all of these scholars; however, it shifts the emphasis from belief and value to sight and scale. Epideictic, in my account
of Aristotle, is the locus of civic sight, the hub of public phantasmatic experience. Through lexis, epideictic discourse produces phantasms that, in turn, function to underlie, inform, and direct political deliberation. Accordingly, there are two main ways that epideictic discourse functions.

First, discourse has an epideictic function when it draws on phantasms to shape the affective ground of deliberation and judgment. This power is derived from the particular relation of phantasy to the emotions. As I discussed above, the *Rhetoric* describes how a rhetor may produce or mitigate emotions through phantasms. Fortenbaugh (1975) and Nussbaum (1994) have discussed Aristotle’s cognitive conception of the emotions. In sum, they show that argument can alter emotion because the passions are tied to belief or opinion, *doxa*. *Doxa*, Fortenbaugh states, is the efficient cause of emotion (1975, 15).

When men are angered, they are not victims of some totally irrational force. Rather they are responding in accordance with the thought of an unjust insult. Their belief may be erroneous and their anger unreasonable, but their behavior is intelligent and cognitive in the sense that it is grounded upon a belief which may be criticized and even altered by argumentation. (17)

However, *De Anima* shows that emotions are not subject to *doxa* derived solely from rational argument. To experience phantasy, Aristotle states, “is to form an opinion [doxa] exactly corresponding to direct perception” (428a). A lexically produced image of something can exert affective power over a spectator inasmuch as the spectator comes to adhere through *doxa* to the veracity of the image, judging it true.

The relationship between rhetorical phantasy, the emotions, and judgment may help explain why Aristotle was concerned with delimiting the proper sphere and end of epideictic over and against deliberative and forensic rhetorics. Aristotle’s particular ambivalence about epideictic and lexis in public discourse, seen especially in book 3 of the *Rhetoric*, has a connection to his anxiety about the corruption of forensic discourse expressed in book 1: “for it is wrong to warp the jury by leading them into anger or envy or pity” (1354a). One way a rhetor may warp a jury is by turning to phantasy to produce phantasms and the consequent emotions. Forensic discourse would assume an epideictic character when it leads jurors into emotional excess through phantasy; phantasy can corrupt the emotional ground of deliberation and judgment.

Discourse also has an epideictic function when it conspicuously invokes the spatial logics of combination and comparison predicated on mag-
ntitude. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle grants the person marked by *megalopsychia* a special social and ethical status worthy of the special social tributes of honor and favorable judgment.

And inasmuch as the great-souled man (*megalopsychon*) deserves most, he must be the best of men. . . . Therefore the truly great-souled man must be a good man. Indeed greatness in each of the virtues would seem to go with greatness of soul. For instance, one cannot imagine the great-souled man running at full speed when retreating in battle, or acting dishonestly: since what motive for base conduct has a man to whom nothing is great? Considering all the virtues in turn, we shall feel it quite ridiculous to picture *[phainoī'] the great-souled man as other than a good man. (1123b)

If phantasia, especially in epideictic amplification, is a means by which *megalopsychia* appears as such in public, this appearance will underlie pragmatic judgments about the actions of the “great-souled” person. The spatial logics of combination and comparison deployed in epideictic are not only distinct from the logics of the enthymeme and example (the logics of pragmatic rhetorics), they also may underlie enthymeme and example by providing a more basic sense of relative scale and shape. Phantasia in discourse thus functions to lay the phenomenological ground of pragmatic rhetorics. For example, in his “Funeral Oration” Pericles compares the magnitude of Athens to the magnitude of Sparta through the lexical construction of an image of Athens; as such, he configured for Athenians a sense of their space, of the relative shape and scale of their city. This phenomenological sense would underlie any collective judgment about the justness of past actions of Athens against Sparta or the expediency of future actions, because such judgments rely on a sense of relative magnitude—of the greater and the lesser—and of greatness as such.20

With respect to my argument, the fluidity and multidimensionality of Aristotle’s theory of epideictic is important. A close reading of the *Rhetoric* shows that Aristotelian epideictic is not an isolated and wholly distinct rhetorical practice; rather it folds into the other rhetorical practices, as, for example, it brings together judicial time (time past) and deliberative time (time future) in a singular event of the present (1358b); or, though epideictic is distinct from the judicial and deliberative rhetoric in *Rhetoric* 1.3, it is of the same species (*eidos*) with the latter in *Rhetoric* 1.9, where Aristotle writes, “Praise and deliberations are part of a common species (*eidos*) in that what one might propose in deliberation becomes encomia when the form of the expression is changed” (1367b). The boundaries of Aristotle’s epideictic are perforated; epideictic stands in various relationships to other
rhetorical practices, and within Aristotle's art of rhetoric itself, inhabits a number of conceptual spaces with respect to time (past, present, future), subject matter (e.g., gods/deceased, humans/beasts, noble/ignoble, honor/shame, virtue/vice), and purpose (e.g., pleasure/pain, serious/trivial, public/personal, earthly/heavenly). This permeability contributes to what Richard Lanham has called epideictic's "classificatory problem" (1991, 164). However, it also explains how epideictic may be "the 'primary' or central form of rhetoric," as Jeffrey Walker says, without having to argue that it is generically or historically so (2000, 41). Rather, we can understand the epideictic function of discourse as primary, central, and primal.

Conclusion

Epideictic-like discourses have significant power. Walker argues that epideictic has generic priority.

"Epideictic" appears as that which shapes and cultivates the basic codes of value and belief by which a society or culture lives; it shapes the ideologies and imageries with which, and by which, the individual members of a community identify themselves; and, perhaps most significantly, it shapes the fundamental grounds, the "deep" commitments and presuppositions, that will underlie and ultimately determine decision and debates in particular pragmatic forums. (2000, 9)

When inflected through the Aristotelian frame I have constructed in this essay, Walker's point needs some modification, an important change in emphasis. Walker suggests that epideictic's most fundamental role lies in its shaping of "the 'deep' commitments and presuppositions," the latter term implying that a linear discursive order forms the basis of a culture. I suggest that epideictic's role lay not in shaping presuppositions but in providing common images for a people and shaping their sense of scale. Discourse displays an epideictic function when it offers visions that are rhetorically "foundational"—that is, these visions underlie both belief and desire, and the remainder of public discourse itself.

In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle calls "choice" (proairesis), which is a foundation of ethics and the hub of politics, "deliberative desire" (bouleutîkê orexis) (1113a). Phantasia, Aristotle argues in De Anima, is indispensable to desire, in that images of a good or desirable object move even the most brute animals. It is indispensable to deliberative desire es-
pecially, in that humans must often deliberate about goods that they cannot see except through phantasia (433a). Phantasia forms the objects of belief and desire, even gives birth to belief and desire, delimits the "communal sense," and provides the images that are the objects of deliberative desire, ethical choice, and political judgment. With respect to reception, a conception of epideictic which stresses phantasia would locate a discursive power at the level of what today we call the "gut," the alogical realm of desire and emotion. Aristotle's ethics, as Fortenbaugh (1975) and Nussbaum (1994) have argued, do not suppress bodily appetites, emotions, and other seemingly "irrational" faculties and basic instincts. Rather, Aristotelian ethics aspire toward a psychological balance or harmony where virtue entails a well-educated appetite. Similarly, an Aristotelian cognitive "virtue" does not suppress or disregard phantasia in favor of higher modes of thought. Rather, higher modes of thought—for example, contemplative reasoning—incorporate and build on the mental images cultivated by phantasia. Phantasia is prior and more basic. In the same way, public discourse, when it assumes an epideictic function, has a prior and more basic role. Put axiomatically: the primal function of public discourse is the phantasmatic. When rhetoric produces corporate phantasmata, these phantasmata form the basis of the deliberative discourse of the polis.

The relationship between phantasmatic and pragmatic rhetorics depends on the degree to which public deliberation is like private deliberation. This is a connection Isocrates explicitly draws: "for the same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our own thoughts" (Antidosis 256). Although Aristotle never reaches the explicitness of Isocrates about this matter, he suggests, in a number of ways, especially in terminology and description, a likeness between private deliberation and rhetorical deliberation. This passage from De Anima is illustrative: "for to decide whether one shall do this or that calls at once for calculation, and one must measure by a single standard; for one pursues the greater good. This implies the ability to combine several images [phantasmatôn] into one" (434a; emphasis original to translation). A sensitivity to the lexical and psychological aspects of Aristotle's Rhetoric, and to the critical place of psychological inquiries in his general corpus of writings, make De Anima's characterizations of private deliberation illuminating for the Rhetoric's conception of public deliberation. De Anima and the Rhetoric, read together, suggest that collective deliberation, though a distinct form of deliberation, shares a general form with private deliberation. It also suggests that as sight is a fundamental
faculty of the human psychê, so it is fundamental to political community. Public deliberation not only rests on a nexus of images and a corresponding sense of scale, it incorporates sight and scale into its calculations and combinations.

Further, the conception of rhetorical phantasia I draw here may help explain Aristotle's original but peculiar and historically inaccurate account of “epideictic” (see Schiappa 1999). No doubt, Aristotle offers a generic classification of epideictic. Furthermore, he relates his classification to contemporaneous practice. However, Aristotle’s discussion of epideictic makes more sense if we understand it less as a generic or historical account and more as a rendering of a particular function of discourse, the phantasmatic function.

Coda: An image of Athens

Thucydides, in his account of the Spartan invasion of Attica and Pericles’ subsequent funeral oration, illustrates the importance of sight to the polis and the phantasmatic function of discourse in an epideictic-styled oration. In the first year of the Peloponnesian War, at Pericles’ behest, all those in the countryside of Attica withdrew into the walls of Athens, resulting in Sparta’s easy invasion of the abandoned countryside. Thucydides stresses the Athenian alarm at the invasion, a gut-level alarm that turned on sight:

But when they saw the army at Acharnae, only seven miles from Athens, they could no longer put up with the situation. Their land was being laid waste in front of their very eyes. . . . Pericles was convinced of the rightness of his own views about not going out to battle, but he saw that for the moment the Athenians were being led astray by their angry feelings. (2.21–22)

The historian’s account thus ties the sight of the enemy invasion on the space of Attica to the Athenians’ collective emotional crisis. The Athenians’ experience here would, from the perspective of Aristotle’s psychology, be pervaded by phantasia.

Thucydides indicates that the crisis was temporarily resolved by Pericles’ funeral oration, a virtual hagiography of Athens. The key trope in the oration is sight, where the concrete is pitted against the abstract in a way entirely consistent with Aristotle’s emphasis on magnifying noble actions in epideictic. Thucydides’ Pericles states,
So and such they were, these men—worthy of their city. We who remain behind may hope to be spared their fate, but must resolve to keep the same daring spirit against the foe. It is not simply a question of estimating the advantages in theory. I could tell you a long story (and you know it as well as I do) about what is to be gained by beating the enemy back. What I would prefer is that you should fix your eyes \( \text{[the\text{o}menous]} \) every day on the greatness of Athens as she really is, and should fall in love with her. When you realize her greatness \( \text{[megal\text{e}]} \), then reflect that what made her great was men with a spirit of adventure, men who knew their duty, men who were ashamed to fall below a certain standard. . . . They gave her their lives, to her and to all of us, and for their own selves they won praises that never grow old, the most splendid of sepulchers—not the sepulchers in which their bodies are laid, but where their glory remains eternal in men’s minds, always there on the right occasion to stir speech or action \( \text{[logou kai ergou kair\text{e}l]} \). (2.43)

Note here the displacement of narrative and theory by the image, as if Pericles could see forward to Quintilian’s rhetorical advice. The oration posits what Nicole Loraux has termed an “imaginary Athens,” or, in more Aristotelian terminology, phantasmatic Athens, an invented Athens conceived in a spatial logic of greatness rather than the sequential logics of narrative or theory (1986, 328).3 This logic, Pericles suggests, is essential to deliberation about what is good for Athens. Pericles’ speech is thus an instantiation and articulation of the primal role of lexical imaging to political deliberation, and this in an epideictic-styled funeral oration. Beneath Pericles’ and Athens’s political, pragmatic deliberations was an image of Athens.

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Notes

I want to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very helpful suggestions. I am indebted to Russel Hirst as well for his help.

1. Fortenbaugh notes that Plato also addresses voice and gesture under the heading lexis, and suggests that Thrasymachus may have too. Delivery and style both have to do with the speaker’s manner (1986, 242–52).

2. Kennedy states that books 1–2 of the Rhetoric were probably written separately from book 3, and only later made a single work by Aristotle (1991, 302). Kennedy estimates that the early core of the Rhetoric (1.3–15) was written before 350 BCE, whereas book 3 may have been written as late as 338 (303–4). Fortenbaugh (1986) also discusses the composition and editorial history of book 3.

4. As Eva Keuls notes, "The two terms energeia and enargeia are not related etymologically. The former comes from the root erg. "work," and has given us the derivative "energy." The latter is derived from the adjective argos, "clear," and means brightness, lucidity and, by extension, visual vividness. In the Greco-Roman rhetorical literature, however, a contamination of the two terms took place. In the Greek texts they are used interchangeably, and in the Latin translations of enargeia the notions of"lucidity," "visual vividness," and "forcefulness" are intermingled in confusion" (1978, 124). My essay shows how this confusion may already be latent in Aristotle's texts. Aristotle's discussion of energeia in book 3 of the Rhetoric, Keuls suggests, might have its origin in sophist rhetorical practices, where visual approaches to rhetoric were already being developed (125).

5. Nussbaum (1978) argues that the meaning of phantasia is closely tied to its cognates. She writes of phantasia and its cognates, "Aristotle uses the verb phainesthai (appear) and related words in the analysis of a wide range of experiences. His account of the faculty of phantasria seems to be closely tied to his usage of the verb and suggests a very general interest in how things in the world appear to living creatures" (1978, 222).


7. I follow here Benedictsson (2000) and Rouveret (1989), who argue that Aristotle's phantasria cannot be properly understood without a strong emphasis on the visual.

8. Wedin (1988) argues that phantasria is not a "full" faculty of the psyche but a subservient and limited one that provides images to other faculties. He thus speaks of the "functional incompleteness" of phantasria.

9. At one point in De Anima, Aristotle writes, "most imaginations [phantasias] are false." Schofield, as I have noted, characterizes Aristotle's attitude toward the veracity of phantasria as skeptical, cautious, and non-committal (1992, 251). "Not every phainomenon [appearance/phenomenon] is aithetes [true/real]," Aristotle states in the Metaphysics (1010b). Later in the same text he writes, "Things, then, are called false in these senses: either because they themselves are unreal, or because the impression [phantasias] derived from them is that of something unreal" (1024b).

10. For Aristotle, Homer in particular exemplified energeia in lexis by "making the lifeless living through metaphor" (Rhetoric 1411b).

11. Pathos has wide usage in Aristotle's corpus, which causes some interpretive difficulties. In De Anima (409b), pathê is coupled with erga to indicate all psychic phenomena. In 427b, pathos is best understood as indicating affective feeling, but not the faculty of the emotions in a technical sense. For more on Aristotle's conception of the emotions, see Fortenbaugh (1975), Leighton (1982), and Nussbaum (1994).

12. As Farrell states (1995), Aristotle himself used "priority" in a number of different senses. My argument does not appeal to any overtly Aristotelian definitions of "primal," "primary," or "priority." Rather, I derive my notions of primal and primary from the particular hierarchy of experiences and faculties reflected in De Anima. Hence, my argument does hinge on a natural order, or the order of the soul, but not exclusively so. Any claims for the priority of eidetic necessarily assume the cultural practice of eidetic and hence are rooted, as Farrell puts it, "in the conventions of culture, where the traction of rhetoric and civic life take their ground of meaning" (188).

13. In the Nicomachean Ethics (1123b), Aristotle uses notions of big and small to show the nature of the person possessing the attribute of megalopsychia.

14. Walter Ong argues that oral cultures were concretial rather than abstract: "Oral cultures tended to use concepts in situational, operational frames of reference that are minimally abstract in the sense that they remain close to the living human lifeworld" (1982, 49). Ong cites Anne Amory Parry, who argued that the Homeric epithet amynon, usually translated "blameless," is best translated "beautiful-in-the-way-a-warrior-ready-to-fight-is-beautiful" (49). Similarly, Eric Havelock connects mnemonic techniques of the ancient world to "words . . . recallable by the use of the eye" (1963, 189), words that created images or highlighted action (188–190).

15. Keuls traces the rhetorical stress on visual imagery to the Pythagoreans. The Pythagoreans used "pictures" (eilkones) to communicate "divine things" (see Keuls 1978, 125).
16. The relationship of epideictic to sight has been the subject of much scholarly discussion. Virtually every contemporary discussion of ancient epideictic practice or theory invokes in some manner the language of sight: witnessing, observing, revealing, showing, displaying. However, Rosenfield alone focuses on and stresses the fundamental visual quality of ancient notions of epideictic. Rosenfield appeals to Aristotle’s conception of nous, which he glosses as “the mind’s eye.” He inflects, through the pre-Socratics, Aristotle’s theory of epideictic, arguing that speaker and audience are engaged in “ beholding reality impartially as witnesses of Being” (1980, 133). His is an account of epideictic that, as I have said, does not attend to its lexical mediation and its dependence on phantasm. Rosenfield is thus able to offer a contemplative, philosophical account of epideictic.

17. As Nussbaum (1994) argues, the appetites and emotions in Aristotle are not “irrational”—they may be educated and shaped by discourse (see esp. 81–91). However, even when the appetites and emotions are educated and shaped, they function in specific situations at a “primal” level—that is, as immediate and “precognitive” (in that they are not products of self-conscious deliberation or reasoning).

18. Fortenbaugh recognizes the role of phantasia in shaping the emotions. Fortenbaugh writes of Aristotle’s conception of the emotion shame in the Rhetoric (1383b–1385a), “Aristotle conceives of shame in such a way that an ashamed person necessarily thinks of or imagines the occurrence of some evil. So much is shame the thought or imagination of something disgraceful that on one occasion Aristotle says simply that shame is phantasia concerning disgrace (1384a22). Shame, then, always involves the thought or imagination of disgrace” (1968, 211).

19. Ἀλήθες and its counterpart psuedēs are criteria by which phantasmata can be judged (428a).

20. What Sheldon S. Wolin argues with respect to political philosophy can be extended to political sensibility more generally. He argues that “political space” had its “origin in the ancient world in the evolution of national consciousness” (1960, 16). The sense of space possessed by a polity not only circumscribed political action, it exerted direct influence on political arrangements. Wolin thus argues that the vision of political space helps constitute political arrangements (17–21).

21. Similarly, Hauser writes of epideictic, “before citizens can imagine the possibility of a vibrant public realm, they require a vocabulary capable of expressing public issues and experiences of publicness, which are civic needs . . . that epideictic addresses” (1999, 6). Hauser positions epideictic as a discourse logically prior to deliberative discourse, where epideictic constructs for the public a vocabulary by which to deliberate.


23. Loroux writes of the Athenians: “Not content with identifying themselves with Athens, the Athenians invented Athens. The Athenian experience of the city cannot be reduced to the empiricism of the political experience so readily attributed to the Greeks; in the polis, as the Athenians of the classical period understood the term, the imaginary occupied a greater place than is usually believed” (1986, 329).

Works Cited


ARISTOTLE’S PHANTASIA


